Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities
利用法国数据，研究部长与市政的两种联系（曾任市长或童年居住地）对中央政府补贴的影响，发现部长曾任市长的市政在部长上任时补贴增加30%，离任时减少，而童年居住地无此效应，表明成人社会关系或职业关切驱动猪肉桶分配。
This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers’ entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism toward childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed pork-barreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead. • We estimate the impact of two connection types on subsidies to French municipalities. • We distinguish municipalities where ministers served from where they grew up. • Municipalities with minister-mayors gain subsidies when they join, lose when they leave. • We see no similar outcomes for municipalities where ministers grew up as children. • Findings suggest career concerns or adult relations drive subsidies, not childhood ties.