CEO pay in the United Kingdom, 1968–2022
研究了1968至2022年间英国大型上市公司CEO薪酬结构和水平的变化，分析最优契约理论与市场失灵理论对历史数据的解释力，发现美国薪酬结构模仿、高边际税率终结等因素导致高管薪酬飙升。
This paper contributes to the literature on British business elites by examining the development of pay structures and levels for CEOs of large listed companies in the United Kingdom for the period 1968–2022. It describes two competing theories about executive pay, ‘optimal contracting theory’ and the ‘market failure approach’, and considers to what extent they help to explain the historical data. The paper notes how the imitation of American pay structures, especially stock options, in the 1980s, along with the ending of high marginal tax rates which had been prevalent in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, coincided with steep rises in executive pay. It concludes that isomorphic social comparisons, a prisoner’s dilemma at the heart of the work of remuneration committees, a collective action problem faced by institutional investors, and a discount that executives apply to the perceived value of stock options has resulted in top pay inflation.