Income smoothing in banks: Obfuscation or information?
研究了银行盈余平滑与贷款损失准备金信息含量的关系，发现平均而言平滑与更信息化的准备金相关，但存在横截面差异和时间变化，且SEC干预后平滑更可能传递信息。
Abstract Discretionary income smoothing has been argued to increase bank opacity and degrade financial system stability by making banks more difficult to monitor. However, no direct empirical association between discretionary smoothing and opacity has been established to date. We argue that smoothing could reflect either the opportunistic exercise of discretion that disconnects loan loss provisions (LLPs) from changes in underlying credit quality, consistent with smoothing increasing opacity, or an informative exercise of discretion to communicate forward‐looking information about loan losses. We examine the association between discretionary smoothing and the informativeness of LLPs for a sample of banks from 1994 to 2019 and find that discretionary smoothing is, on average, associated with more informative LLPs. However, this association is nuanced, with cross‐sectional differences and changes over time. We find evidence that an intervention by the SEC into bank LLP practices in the late 1990s curbed opportunistic smoothing via provisioning for homogeneous loans. Subsequently, smoothing is associated with more informative provisions, including for banks with both more homogeneous and more heterogeneous loan portfolios. Our findings are inconsistent with the notion that smoothing may be associated with greater opacity.