Political Accountability During Crises: Evidence From 40 Years of Financial Policies
研究发现任期限制促使政治人物在金融危机后偏向推行利于现有银行的金融政策，如抬高银行业准入门槛，而旋转门是关键原因。有助于理解危机期间政策制定的政治逻辑。
ABSTRACT We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial deliberalization than those facing reelection, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favor incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We propose a conceptual framework and several mechanisms to rationalize this behavior and show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank‐friendly policies after crises.