The Global Union Federations and their affiliates: Constrained agency in action
研究了全球工会联合会与附属组织互动中的受限能动性，指出其既受制于附属组织又试图自主行动，对理解全球劳工治理有参考价值。
Global Union Federations (GUFs) pursue their agendas in ways that are both enabled and constrained by their relational interactions with affiliates. These interactions have been primarily understood in terms of the principle of subsidiarity – a perspective that positions the GUFs as playing a residual, passive role in global labour governance rather than as organisations with the potential for autonomous action and strategic agency. Drawing on data gathered at the headquarters level, in the GUFs’ Asia-Pacific regional offices, and from GUF affiliates in the Asian region, this article argues for the utility of the concept of ‘constrained agency’ as a more useful way of analysing the tensions between GUFs’ desire to act strategically at the global scale, their duty to respond to the needs and agendas of their affiliates, and their reliance on the varying effectiveness and capacities of those affiliates to achieve their strategic aims.