Political connections cause resource misallocation: Evidence from the fall of fascism in Italy
利用1943-1944年意大利法西斯倒台后法律剥夺前法西斯政客任职资格这一准自然实验，发现政治关联被外生切断后，原关联企业经济表现显著差于同行，表明政治关联导致资源错配。
Abstract The fall of fascism in Italy in 1943–1944 was followed by the issuance of laws and decrees that made former fascist politicians ineligible for political office. This setting provides a unique quasi‐natural experiment that exogenously and permanently disrupted then prevalent corporate political connections. We find that following the exogenous disruption of their political connections, previously politically connected firms significantly underperform their peers both economically and statistically. These results imply that political connections lead to misallocation of economic resources.