Do Unexpected Earnings of Industry Leaders Affect the Discretionary Reporting Behavior of Followers? Evidence From China
研究中国行业领导者的意外盈利如何影响追随者公司自主决定年报披露时间及盈余管理行为，发现追随者会延迟披露并利用降低有效税率进行最后一刻盈余管理。
ABSTRACT This study examines how the unexpected earnings of industry leaders influence the discretionary reporting behavior of industry followers. Chinese firms are required to disclose their annual earnings announcement (EA) dates before the fiscal year ends. Leveraging this unique setting, we demonstrate that followers delay their EAs in response to earnings surprises reported by industry leaders. This effect is more pronounced for followers who face lower costs of delaying (i.e., those with weak corporate governance and who face no penalties for delaying EAs) and those who receive greater benefits from delaying (i.e., those in more competitive industries and in industries where leaders meet or beat market expectations). We also find that, compared with other followers, those that delay EAs are more likely to engage in last‐minute earnings management by reducing their effective tax rates. Furthermore, our findings suggest that when industry leaders report good news, followers who delay EAs are more likely to do the same. However, we find no positive market reaction to these delayed EAs. Overall, this study provides new evidence that industry leaders’ earnings surprises significantly impact their followers’ decisions about discretionary financial reporting, including the delay of EAs and last‐minute earnings management.