Efficient public good provision between and within groups
将Gallice和Monzón（2019）的模型推广到包含群体、位置不确定性和观察学习的公共品博弈，发现自利玩家在固定期限内可实现群体内外完全合作，位置不确定性使群体有条件合作以影响后续群体，群体内成员的关键性使有效供给成为均衡。
We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.