Seemingly Self-Sabotaging Disclosures
研究了当潜在进入者和监管者都激励企业隐瞒好消息时，两者的共同存在反而可能促使企业自愿披露好消息，看似自我破坏但通过让出垄断地位提升消费者剩余并降低监管成本，最终增加企业价值。
ABSTRACT Firm disclosures are observed by multiple audiences with diverse interests. Recognizing this practical feature, studies have examined how conflicting incentives provided by the multiple recipients of the information affect disclosure outcomes. Understandably, studies have not examined scenarios wherein disclosure incentives from recipients align in the same direction. With aligned incentives, disclosure incentives are presumably “additive.” This paper challenges such thinking. We model a firm that faces a potential entrant and a scrutinizing regulator so each individually incentivizes the firm to withhold favorable market news. However, we show that their joint presence can drastically change the disclosure equilibrium: the firm may voluntarily disclose good news seemingly in self-sabotage. Such disclosures attract entry, compelling the firm to yield its monopoly position. However, by ceding market power, the firm boosts consumer surplus and soothes regulatory concerns. The ensuing reduction in regulatory costs borne by the firm can then increase the firm’s overall value.