More than solely reactive: Audit committee director departures as anticipatory actions in financial misstatements
研究了财务错报对审计委员会董事离职的影响，发现董事离职不仅是反应性的，还可能是预期性的，在问题公开前就主动退出。对财务报表使用者、董事会和治理活动家有参考价值。
ABSTRACT This study investigates the impact of financial misstatements on audit committee director departures, focusing on anticipatory and reactive actions. By analyzing data from restating and non‐restating firms between 2004 and 2020, we categorize the misstatement process into pre‐occurrence, occurrence, investigation, and post‐announcement periods. Our findings reveal that audit committee directors in restating firms are significantly more likely to depart in all four periods, compared with their counterparts in non‐restating firms. We further explore how the likelihood of departure is influenced by directors’ characteristics, including financial expertise, gender, busyness, tenure, and age. The results suggest that financial misstatements are not merely reactionary events that prompt director departures but also serve as anticipatory signals leading to proactive exits before issues become public. This study provides valuable insights for financial statement users, boards of directors, and governance activists.