Spatial Bioinvasion Externalities with Heterogeneous Landowner Preferences: A Two-Agent Bioeconomic Model
研究了两类偏好不同的森林土地所有者（休闲与木材生产）在生物入侵中的外部性成本，发现入侵始于休闲地产时社会成本最大，最优补贴应针对较弱联系的土地所有者。
Preference heterogeneity among landowners managing transboundary resources can determine the production of externalities across their lands. We test this hypothesis in the context of an invasive species affecting two forest landowners where one values their property for recreation and the other produces timber. Using a spatially explicit first-mover repeated game, we find that the social cost of the externality is greatest when a bioinvasion starts on the recreation property. Except for species with fast long-distance dispersal, the optimal subsidy is nonuniform, targeting the landowner who acts as the weaker link, regardless of where a bioinvasion starts. Key words: bioeconomics; ecosystem services; externalities; forest health; invasive plants; spatial-dynamic modeling.