Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
在两家金融公司的大规模现场实验中，随机改变工资和竞业禁止条款，发现取消竞业禁止使员工在竞对雇主间的流动率提高36%到52%，总收入提高12%到17%，且未发现商业机密泄露或工资溢价补偿的证据。适合关注劳动市场管制和合同设计的读者判断是否阅读原文。
<div> <div> <div> <div> <p>We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes. Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36-52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12-17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.</p> </div> <div> <br> </div> </div> </div> </div>