Macroprudential Regulation, Quantitative Easing, and Bank Lending
研究发现，依赖历史成本会计的宏观审慎监管会削弱量化宽松等货币政策对银行放贷的传导效果，基于意大利银行数据提出替代政策。
Abstract We show that widely used macroprudential regulations that rely on historical cost accounting (HCA) to insulate banks’ balance sheets from financial market volatility significantly affect the transmission of monetary policy onto bank lending. Using detailed supervisory data from Italian banks, we find that HCA mutes the transmission of quantitative easing and other monetary policies that affect the long end of the yield curve, weakening the effectiveness of interventions aimed at reducing firm credit constraints. We suggest alternative policies that have the benefits of HCA but allow monetary policy to pass through.