Patronage Networks, Personal Ties, and Political Selection: Evidence from a New Group of Subnational Officials in China
研究中国省级党委常委的选拔与晋升机制，发现若曾提拔其进入常委的省委书记后来成为国家领导人，该常委更易晋升，且这种庇护网络培养了下级对上级的忠诚，但在政治清洗中可能危及下属仕途。
ABSTRACT The current literature has paid much attention to the political selection of China’s subnational party secretaries and government executives (e.g., provincial governors). However, the party’s rule of collective leadership dictates that it is the Chinese Communist Party Provincial Standing Committee (PPSC), a group of officials with substantial power over local affairs, that collectively rules the province. How the members of PPSC are selected and promoted remains surprisingly understudied. This article fills this gap by examining how various types of personal connections with senior leaders can account for their career advancements. Empirical results show that they are more likely to be promoted if the provincial party secretary who once promoted them to the PPSC members later becomes a national leader. Further evidence indicates that this promotion-based patronage network fosters loyalty of junior officials to senior ones. Finally, we show that such patronage may also jeopardize the clients’ political careers during purges.