Strategic insider trading and its consequences for outsiders: Evidence from the eighteenth century
利用18世纪无法律限制内幕交易时期的交易数据，研究发现内幕人通过隐藏身份和择时交易获得显著高于外部人的回报，导致外部人预期损失。
This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.