Monetary union effects on high inflation episodes
研究货币联盟成员身份能否缩短高通胀事件的持续时间，基于190个国家1950年1月至2022年12月的数据，发现货币联盟显著缩短高通胀时长，但效果随成员国增加而减弱。
Abstract This paper analyses whether monetary union membership reduces the duration of high inflation episodes (HIEs). The study uses survival models estimated on a sample of 190 countries over the period 1950M01 to 2022M12. The results show that despite the often‐cited issue of the heterogeneity of member countries, monetary unions significantly reduce the duration of HIEs, but not deflation episodes. This result remains robust to a battery of tests and is valid for both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, the results show that giving up monetary sovereignty in favour of an independent common central bank is more effective in terms of price stability than adopting inflation targeting. However, for countries seeking to preserve their monetary sovereignty, inflation targeting remains the best option for reducing the duration of HIEs. This performance of monetary unions in terms of price stability appears to be linked to the greater de facto independence of their central banks, the adoption of supranational fiscal rules, and the incentives to preserve the durability of the currency area. However, estimates show that the capacity of a monetary union to limit HIEs among its members diminishes as it expands to include new countries.