Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
研究了付费电视企业在上游争夺广播权、下游争夺观众时，独占权为何成为均衡结果且可能损害福利，并分析了禁止转售和禁止捆绑投标为何无法改善福利。
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property , allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.