Complementary bidding and cartel detection: Evidence from Nordic asphalt markets
研究了北欧沥青铺设市场中的两个大型采购卡特尔，发现卡特尔期间投标集中且中标价孤立，并测试了两种统计检测方法，表明低数据要求的筛选方法对竞争执法机构有用。
A key challenge in cartel enforcement is identifying collusive agreements. We study two major Nordic procurement cartels that operated in the asphalt paving market. We find evidence that during the cartel period bids were clustered and the winning bid was isolated. We implement two cartel detection methods that exploit variation in the distribution of bids. The method developed by Clark et al. (forthcoming) correctly rejects competitive bidding for the cartel period in both markets. The method suggested by Huber and Imhof (2019) achieves a high prediction rate in one of the markets but not in the market where the cartel had a more modest impact on bid distribution. Our results suggest that statistical screening methods with low data requirements can be useful for competition authorities in detecting collusive agreements.