Leading-by-example and the voluntary provision of public goods in rural areas: Experimental evidence from China
通过在中国农村进行公共物品博弈实验，比较政治领导人和随机选出的领导人的以身作则效应，发现两者均能显著提高村民的自愿贡献，但追随政治领导人的模仿行为较弱。
Abstract Comparing randomly selected and real-world political leaders, this paper investigates the effect of leading-by-example on voluntary contributions in a linear contribution mechanism public goods game experiment with 550 residents in rural China. This setting provides a unique social structure, shaping people’s responses to leadership. We find that leading-by-example set by political leaders and randomly selected leaders increases participants’ contribution by 1.432 and 1.162 Chinese Yuan, which is an increase of approximately 22 and 18 per cent of average contributions in the control group. The difference in the effects of leading-by-example set by political leaders and randomly selected leaders is small and statistically insignificant. Contributions under the leading-by-example treatments are driven by increased contributions from leaders and mimicking behaviour of followers, although following political leaders is weaker. Our findings highlight the crucial role of leading-by-example and strong village-level institutions in the provision of public goods.