Price Floors and Employer Preferences: Evidence from a Minimum Wage Experiment
通过在线劳动力市场的随机实验，研究最低工资对雇主招聘行为的影响，发现最低工资导致雇佣减少、工资上升、工时下降，并促使雇主转向雇佣更高生产率的工人。
Firms posting job openings in an online labor market were randomly assigned minimum hourly wages. When facing a minimum wage, fewer firms hired, but those they did hire paid higher wages. Hoursworked fell substantially. Treated firms shifted to hiring more productive workers. Using the platform's imposition of a market-wide minimum wage after the experiment, I find that many of the experimental results also hold in equilibrium, including the substitution towards more productive workers. However, there was also a large reduction in the number of jobs posted for which the minimum wage would likely bind.