Organized Voters: Elections and Public Funding of Nonprofits
利用法国协会的政府转移支付数据和接近选举的结果，研究发现政治家会向意识形态接近的组织提供更多资金，尤其是当地方现任者是政治盟友且以微弱优势当选时，这表明组织通过选票而非捐款换取财政支持。
What makes politicians respond to civil society organizations' demands? I use new data on government transfers to French associations and exploit close elections to show that politicians grant more funds to ideologically close organizations when the local incumbent is a political ally and was elected by a small margin. The results are consistent with politicians and organizations exchanging financial support for electoral support. Organizations secure funding because of the votes they can deliver, not because of their campaign contributions; however, the fact that transfers appear to be conditioned on support may undermine their ability to help hold politicians accountable.