Does shareholder overlap alleviate patent holdup?
研究机构股东在拥有基础专利的公司与后续创新者之间的重叠能否减少专利劫持问题，发现重叠越多，后续创新者的专利组合越成功、专利诉讼越少、研发投入越高。
Patent protection can generate holdup problems for follow-on innovators when technologies protected in early patents complement their inventions. This study investigates whether institutional shareholder overlap between firms with precursory patents and follow-on innovators can reduce such patent holdup problems. Using patent citation links to track complementary patents, we find empirical support for such a holdup attenuation hypothesis of institutional shareholder overlap. Follow-on innovators with greater institutional shareholder overlap to precursory patent owners enjoy greater success with their patent portfolio, face less patent conflict as measured by patent litigation , and feature higher levels of R&D investments. The holdup attenuation effect is stronger if product complexity makes securing ex ante patent licenses more difficult.