Internal Disruption: Examining the Relationship Between Interim CEO Successions and Executive Turnover
研究发现临时CEO继任比直接继任导致更多高管离职，若前任CEO被解雇或临时CEO兼任董事长则离职率更高，且前任被解雇时的高管离职会损害后续公司绩效。
ABSTRACT Research Question/Issue Although research on interim CEO successions has increased, there remains limited knowledge about what internal repercussions interim CEO appointments have on firms, notably on incumbent executives. This study seeks to understand whether and how interim CEO appointments are related to executive turnover, focusing on the role and involvement of the board in the interim succession process. Research Findings/Insights Interim CEO successions are related to higher executive turnover compared to direct CEO successions. This turnover is further augmented either when the preceding CEO was fired or when the interim CEO is also the board chair. We also find that, when the preceding CEO was fired, the executive turnover related to interim CEO successions is related to poorer subsequent firm performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications This research fills an important gap in the interim CEO succession literature, focusing on the internal repercussions of interim CEO appointments, particularly how incumbent executives may be affected and how this may influence firm performance. It reconciles the view that interim CEOs may engage in limited decision‐making, whereas the board uses the interim period to plan for the firm's future. Practitioner/Policy Implications This paper highlights the potential disruptions caused by interim CEO successions and offers some insights into how these may affect executives and firm performance. Moreover, this paper acts as a guide for stakeholders on the nuanced governance decisions around interim CEO appointments.