Groupthink in the Board of Family Firms: The Case of Institutional Investment
研究家族企业董事会的群体思维如何影响机构投资，发现群体思维会降低机构投资，而良好的公司治理（如董事会多样性、低任期等）能缓解这一问题。
This study explores groupthink on the boards of family firms. We conjecture that institutional investors, in the face of principal–principal agency issues, are discouraged by groupthink and consequently invest less in family firms. Appropriate corporate governance in the form of greater board diversity, lower director tenure, busier boards, more financial disclosure, and bigger shareholder voice should help in alleviating these institutional investor concerns. We examine a sample of firms from the S&P 500 and find evidence consistent with these propositions. Also, we provide evidence that board generational heterogeneity in family firms exacerbates groupthink.