Does stakeholder orientation mitigate shareholder-employee conflicts? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
利用美国州级选区法规的颁布作为准自然实验，研究发现采用该法规的公司进行股票回购并导致养老金资金不足的倾向更弱，尤其在违约风险高的公司中，机制涉及工会干预和董事会中的劳工代表。
This paper examines the influence of stakeholder orientation on the shareholder-employee conflict characterized by the propensity of firms to engage in share purchases and leave employee pensions underfunded. Utilizing the enactment of US state-level constituency statutes, we find that firms in states that have adopted constituency statutes exhibit a weaker share repurchase-pension underfunding propensity, especially those with high default risk. The mechanism is through union intervention and labor representatives on boards. The effect is moderated for firms headquartered in high-social-capital regions, operating with higher human capital, possessing a history of employee litigation, and maintaining lower and short-horizon institutional ownership. After implementing constituency statutes, share repurchase announcements are associated with lower returns for firms with higher pension deficits. Our findings suggest that stakeholder orientation can discipline the shareholder-employee conflict.