On the Folly of Rewarding Your Version of Performance: Signaling and the Double Empathy Problem in Pay‐For‐Performance Across Neurotypes
研究指出，针对自闭症员工的绩效薪酬制度因神经典型管理者与自闭症员工之间的双重共情问题，可能导致信号误解和负面后果，并基于信号理论构建模型解释这一过程。
ABSTRACT As many organizations have sought to increase their neurodiversity, they have tended to focus on human resource (HR) practices and programs for increasing representation, especially of autistic employees. There has been comparatively less attention regarding HR practices that relate to sustaining employment and fostering workplace performance for autistic employees. Sustaining employment is a particular challenge because the signals sent by HR practices and the neurotypical managers implementing them are often differently interpreted by autistic employees—the double empathy problem. As the pay practices and pay‐for‐performance (PFP) systems critical to retention and career advancement have increasingly broadened beyond objective assessments of task performance to include more subjective assessments and contextual performance, the double empathy problem can worsen leading to unintended negative consequences. We draw upon signaling theory to theorize how and when PFP worsens or mitigates the double empathy problem. Specifically, we develop a model and set of propositions that posit how the attributes of signals (observability, consistency, and frequency), the resulting shared relevance of signals, their effects on behavior, and managers' subsequent interpretations of employee behavior and performance form a cycle through which performance‐reward signals tighten or loosen and, in turn, affect autistic employee well‐being and turnover. We close by discussing how our model may apply to other forms of neurodivergence and implications for future research regarding the practices, signals, and interpretations that create or inhibit environments supportive of neurodiversity.