Achieving safety: Personal, private, and public provision
研究最低安全需求如何影响投资选择，发现个人资产作为自我保险，私人中介内生提供安全利率以减少低效自我保险，而公共安全供给（如公共债务或存款保险）会意外影响私人安全供给和总投资。
We study how a primary need for minimum safety affects investment choices. In addition to risky projects, agents may choose to invest in personal assets they can control. Investing in personal assets serves as self-insurance, as they ensure a higher minimum return but offer a lower expected return than the risky project offers. In autarky, investors ensure a minimum return by personal assets, besides investing in the risky project. Private intermediaries and a safe rate arise endogenously to limit inefficient self-insurance, with self-insured investors holding bank equity to safeguard private safe debt. The endogenous conflict over interim risk choices is resolved by demandable debt, forcing early liquidation in some states. Our work highlights the unintended consequences of public provision of safety for private provision of safety and aggregate investment, demonstrating that these effects depend critically on whether public provision takes the form of public debt or deposit insurance.