Toward mass adoption of electric vehicles: policy optimisation under different infrastructure investment scenarios
研究政府如何从三种补贴方案（纯消费补贴、纯基础设施补贴或两者结合）中选择最优方案，以促进电动汽车普及，发现补贴策略取决于充电基础设施由谁投资以及普及目标与成本的高低。
Mass adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) is seen as a key solution for environmental degradation and a low-carbon economy. To promote EV adoption, the government's should choose the most efficient subsidy scheme from three options: a pure purchase subsidy for consumers, a pure infrastructure subsidy for automakers, or a combination of both. This study models the interactions among the government, automakers, and consumers using a Stackelberg game to identify the optimal subsidy structure, considering supply chain structures and infrastructure investments. Our findings show that a pure subsidy is optimal only when the supplier invests in charging infrastructure. However, if the automaker invests in infrastructure, a combination of both subsidies becomes beneficial. The government’s subsidy strategy depends on the adoption target and infrastructure investment costs. A combined policy is optimal when both the target and costs are high; otherwise, a pure subsidy is more cost-effective. Additionally, we find a complementary relationship between government subsidies and competition. Competition within the EV supply chain reduces the need for large subsidies, helping alleviate the government’s financial burden. Finally, while the most cost-effective subsidy scheme may be efficient in reducing costs, it can lead to poor economic performance and lower profits in certain cases.