Multiple equilibria in mean-field game models of firm competition with strategic complementarities
研究了连续时间平均场随机博弈中战略互补性导致的多重均衡，通过格论证明最小和最大均衡的存在性，并用数值例子分析战略互动强度与多重均衡的关系。
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold. Existence of minimal and maximal equilibria is shown via lattice-theoretical arguments, and sufficient conditions for deriving comparative statics of the equilibria are presented. A detailed numerical study, based on iterative schemes converging to the maximal and minimal equilibria, allows us to analyze in relevant financial examples of how the emergence of multiple equilibria is related to the intensity of strategic interactions.