Evolving wars of attrition
研究了随时间演进的消耗战，其中双方战斗成本随公共状态随机变化，并分析了部分让步对均衡结果的影响，为理解延迟和最终分配提供新视角。
This paper models a war of attrition that evolves over time. Two players fight over a prize until one surrenders. The flow costs of fighting depend on a state variable that is public but changes stochastically as the war unfolds. In the unique equilibrium, each player surrenders when the state becomes adverse enough; for intermediate states, both players fight on. In an extension, the baseline model is augmented to allow for unilateral concessions of part of the prize. Such concessions can be beneficial if they disproportionately sap the opponent's incentive to fight. The evolving war of attrition with concessions yields predictions regarding delay and the eventual division of the prize that differ from conventional models of bargaining as well as reputational wars of attrition.