Globalization of capital flows and the (in)disciplining of nations
分析了资本外逃威胁是否约束政府并改善治理，发现存在竞争性渠道：有效治理时政府减少外部冲击暴露，治理失败时资本外逃威胁产生纪律效应，但可能损害治理质量，因此提出适度资本管制的作用。
We analyze whether the threat of capital flight “disciplines” governments and improves governance. Our findings show that the globalization of capital flows influences governance through two competing channels. When a government effectively manages domestic governance, it seeks to minimize exposure to sudden capital flight driven by external factors. In contrast, when a government fails to manage domestic governance, the threat of capital flight can impose discipline, improving governance and welfare by placing the country in a “golden straitjacket”—the disciplining effect. However, capital flight may also negatively affect governance quality. As a result, this paper proposes a novel and qualified role for modest capital controls . Finally, we present evidence consistent with the predictions of our theoretical framework.