Two-Sided Matching in the Audit Market
构建并估计了审计师与客户之间的双边匹配模型，发现双方基于可观测和不可观测特征进行匹配，且这种匹配部分解释了“四大”审计效果，控制匹配后四大审计对严重重述和SEC问询函的正面影响减弱或消失。
ABSTRACT We develop and estimate a two-sided matching model of auditors and clients. We find evidence that auditors and clients engage in matching based on their preferences on both observable and unobservable characteristics. This matching appears to partly explain the “Big 4 effect” on audit outcomes: after controlling for the effects of matching, we find that the positive influence of having a Big 4 auditor on serious restatements and serious comment letter conversations with the SEC either weakens or disappears. Collectively, our results highlight the importance of accounting for two-sided matching between auditors and clients in understanding the influence of auditors on clients’ financial reporting practices. JEL Classifications: M40; M42