Fighting for Lemons: The Balancing Effect of Private Information on Incentives in Dynamic Contests
研究了多阶段共同价值竞赛中，私人信息如何通过阶段结果的学习效应平衡落后者的沮丧，使总激励超过公开信息情形甚至静态基准，并导致持久竞争。
Abstract In a common-value environment with multi-stage competition, losing a stage conveys positive news about a rival’s estimation of a contested prize, capable of balancing the discouraging effect of falling behind. We show that, due to players’ learning from stage outcomes, aggregate incentives under private information are often greater than under public information and may even exceed the static competition benchmark. Moreover, laggards can become more motivated than leaders, giving rise to long-lasting fights. Our results have implications for the duration of R&D races, the desirability of feedback in labour and procurement contests, and the campaign spending and selective efficiency of presidential primaries.