Agreeing on public goods or bads
研究了当公共品对某些人有益、对另一些人有害时，代理人如何通过形成联盟来协调供给，发现相比纯公共品或纯公共害品情形，更大规模的联盟在均衡中形成，且大联盟在多数情况下稳定。
Without regulation or agreement, public goods are underprovided and public bads are overprovided. Both problems are usually seen as flip sides of the same coin. In this paper we examine a situation where a public good is good for some agents but bad for others, depending on the provisioning level of the good. We allow agents to form a coalition to coordinate this provision. Our results show that, compared to games with only goods (or only bads), larger coalitions form in equilibrium. For a game specification with quadratic benefit- and cost functions, we find the grand coalition to be stable except when agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The primary driver of coalition stability is the avoidance of a wasteful contest between agents pulling the provision level in opposing directions. In equilibrium, such wasteful contests are confined to a narrow range within the parameter space. This result connects the literatures on public goods and contests.