Between Merit and Patronage: Hybrid Appointments of Top Civil Service
研究伊拉克库尔德地区政府高级公务员任命中功绩与政治忠诚的混合机制，通过访谈和数据分析挑战传统二元对立观点，对理解发展中国家官僚任命有参考价值。
ABSTRACT This article examines the complex balancing of political loyalty and meritocratic competence in the appointment of top civil servants—a pivotal aspect of public administration that is particularly relevant in developing contexts. Focusing on the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq, this study aims to unravel how merit and patronage converge in the appointment processes of director generals (DGs). To this end, the article develops an analytical framework that conceptualizes “hybrid appointments” as a process in which merit‐based and patronage considerations are intricately interwoven. The article uses a mixed‐method research design, combining elite interviews with senior politicians and a quantitative analysis of original biographical data on top civil servants. It shows how politicians weigh merit‐based qualifications alongside political considerations in the appointment process, rather than substituting loyalty for competence. This finding challenges the traditional dichotomous understanding of merit versus patronage appointments, advancing our understanding of how top civil service appointments function in developing contexts.