Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies
研究了420,153名企业高管在12,869家公司的工作经历，发现超半数公司至少有一名高管曾在行政部门机构任职，且前监管者离职两年内入职的公司更易获得采购合同，但合同更易被重新谈判，增加政府成本。
Abstract We develop an extensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon by examining the work experience of 420,153 individuals in top corporate positions at 12,869 firms. More than half of these firms have at least one such individual with prior experience in one of 187 executive branch agencies. We find that firms are more likely to receive procurement contracts following the appointment of a former regulator transitioning within 2 years of leaving the agency, a result consistent with the “knowledge” hypothesis. Less-complex contracts signed following the appointment of former regulators are more likely to be renegotiated, increasing costs for the government.