Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments
通过大规模现场实验，研究了能效补贴与节能信息如何相互影响消费者需求，发现信息会降低价格弹性、削弱补贴效果，并估计出福利最大化的补贴可高于庇古基准两倍。
Abstract How can information substitute or complement financial incentives such as Pigouvian subsidies? We answer this question in a large-scale field experiment that cross-randomizes energy efficiency subsidies with information about the financial savings of LED lighting. Information has two effects: It shifts and rotates demand curves. The direction of the shift is ambiguous and highly dependent on the information design. Informing consumers that an LED saves 90% in annual energy costs increases LED demand, but showing them that 90% corresponds to an average of €11 raises demand for less efficient technologies. The rotation of the demand curve is unambiguous: Information dramatically reduces both own-price and cross-price elasticities, which makes subsidies less effective. The uniform decrease in price elasticities suggests that consumers pay less attention to subsidies when information is provided. We structurally estimate that welfare-maximizing subsidies can be 200% larger than the Pigouvian benchmark when combined with information.