Axiomatic risk sharing and capital allocation
研究了在流动性约束下，有限个代理人之间分担风险性禀赋的问题，通过公理化方法刻画了基线解，并提出一种公平条件，其中K-公平解由约束平均主义配给规则唯一确定。
We aim to share risky endowments among finitely many agents, subject to liquidity constraints. We axiomatically characterize <i>baseline </i>solutions, which use a baseline vector of fixed contributions and a rationing method. We propose a general fairness condition, that uniquely determines these fixed contributions. The fairness condition is flexible enough to allow for the use of any capital allocation rule. One rule stands out as a <i><b>K</b></i>-fair solution: the one implied by the constrained egalitarian rationing rule. It is the unique rule satisfying a lower bound on taking part of the risk, a composition property, and null consistency. Furthermore, we provide two more characterizations of this rule; one based on local symmetry and one based on minimax expected contributions under truncation.