Complex pricing and consumer-side attention
研究两家差异化企业通过两部收费制菜单竞争，部分消费者不知线性单价时，限制价格歧视的两种规制干预对利润和福利的影响，为政策评估提供参考。
This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms' ability to price discriminate: (i) diminishing the range of contracts by reducing the number of two-part tariffs offered (which prohibits inter-group price discrimination); and (ii) reducing tariff complexity by abolishing linear fees (which prohibits inter-group and intra-group price discrimination). We characterize the effects of these interventions on firm profits and consumer welfare, and we identify conditions for the optimal regulatory policy. Our results provide insights for the evaluation of policy interventions.