Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions
研究了金融输电权拍卖中参与者行使单边市场势力的动机，发现标准清算机制通过跨路径竞争限制需求削减的盈利性，模拟表明该机制能大幅减少单边市场势力带来的租金，并指出分散化销售等改革可能削弱跨路径竞争。
This paper explores market participants’ incentives to exercise unilateral market power in financial transmission rights (FTR) auctions. I present a model of strategic bidding in FTR auctions that illustrates how the standard market clearing mechanism for FTR auctions facilitates cross-path competition, limiting the profitability of demand reduction. Simulation evidence suggests that this force can dramatically reduce rents from unilateral market power relative to other sources of auction revenue shortfalls, highlighting potential adverse effects from proposed market reforms such as decentralized FTR sales and bidding-path restrictions that may weaken cross-path competition.