Equilibrium horizontal queues and a paradox of tolling
在弹性需求的静态交通模型中，提高收费可能反而增加网络中的均衡出行量，这一反直觉结果在水平排队和特定合流分流规则下成立，并通过三种网络结构（固定瓶颈、触发瓶颈分流、环形路网）加以验证。
This paper shows that, in a static traffic model with elastic demand, increasing a toll may raise the equilibrium trip rate through a network. The result is obtained in models with horizontal queues and rules about merges and diverges assumed in the Cell Transmission Model for Network Traffic. The paper looks at three networks: (i) a road with a fixed bottleneck at the end; (ii) a road with a “triggerneck” diverge; and (iii) a ring road with two on-ramps and two off-ramps. In the triggerneck network, a toll increase may raise the total trip rate when traffic using an exit with bottleneck has a lower value of travel time savings than traffic bypassing the bottleneck. In the ring road, a toll increase may raise the total trip rate when the initial equilibrium is hypercongested. The derivations use an extensible “recipe” for analysis of networks with horizontal queues. Many diagrams and numerical examples are provided to illustrate. • Analyzes three static models of networks with elastic demand and horizontal queues. • Show that an increase in tolls may raise the equilibrium trip rate. • Provides an economic analysis of Vickrey’s “triggerneck” scenario. • Derives a Network Exit Function and Entry Supply Function for a ring network.