Internal Information Quality and Performance Metric Selection
研究了公司内部信息质量如何影响高管激励合同中的绩效指标选择，发现高质量内部信息与更多、更独特的非财务指标相关，且这些指标在高信息质量下能提升未来盈利能力。
We examine the role of firms’ internal information quality (IIQ) in designing executive incentive contracts. We find that higher IIQ is associated with a greater number of performance metrics and increased dissimilarity from peer firms’ contracts, particularly along non-financial dimensions. These relations hold when we examine changes in IIQ that are likely induced by plausibly exogenous shifts in two financial accounting standards. We further find that incorporating more numerous and more dissimilar non-financial metrics is positively associated with future profitability, but only when IIQ is high. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the quality of a firm’s internal information is a friction in performance metric selection.