Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation
研究了政府可能征用私营企业管理的基础设施租金时，如何通过最优融资合同（如政府担保、共同投资、税收补贴）解决双重道德风险，吸引外部投资者。
Abstract We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing contracts involve government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to agree not to expropriate, thus improving private sector incentives and project quality. The contract also reflects several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing in practice, among which are government coinvestment, tax subsidies, and development rights.