Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third‐Party Loan Guarantees
研究了第三方贷款担保这一小企业常见融资渠道，发现担保人比银行更擅长筛选借款人，能帮助抵押不足的企业获得贷款，并提高小企业贷款效率。
Abstract We provide the first theoretical and empirical study on third‐party loan guarantees, a prevalent financing channel worldwide for small borrowers. In our model, the project default probability is unobservable but can be probabilistically discovered with a screening cost. Guarantors, who are more cost‐effective in screening than banks, investigate borrowers and facilitate the financing of borrowers with insufficient collateral. Our data support this outsourcing theory: guarantor's risk measure predicts firms' default losses. Patterns of guarantee fees and loan rates are consistent with model predictions. Our findings illustrate how guarantors produce information and increase the efficiency of small business lending.