Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining
研究了在一致同意规则下，参与者通过事先承诺最低份额导致集体决策出现低效拖延的现象，发现只有一致同意规则是低效的，其他多数规则均能实现完全效率。
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient.