Long-Term Relationships in the US Truckload Freight Industry
研究了美国整车货运行业中托运人与承运人之间的长期关系，发现托运人通过终止关系的威胁来抑制承运人的短期机会主义行为，但激励方案并未充分利用关系的全部时空范围。
This paper provides evidence on the scope and incentive mechanisms of long-term relationships in the US truckload freight industry. In this setting, shippers and carriers engage in repeated interactions under fixed-rate contracts that allow for inefficient opportunism. The main dynamic mechanism involves shippers using the threat of relationship termination to deter carriers from short-term opportunism. This threat and the potential of future rents induce more carrier cooperation. We test this mechanism against likely alternatives and analyze relationship scope for different carrier types. We find that incentive schemes do not exploit the full temporal and spatial scope of relationships.