Sticky Wages on the Layoff Margin
通过对失业保险领取者的创新调查，发现多数人愿意接受5-10%的减薪以保住工作，但劳资双方很少讨论减薪替代裁员，约四分之一的裁员违背了双边有效分离的理论条件。
We design and field an innovative survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients that yields new insights about wage stickiness on the layoff margin. A majority of UI recipients would accept pay cuts of 5–10 percent to save their jobs, and one-third would accept a 25 percent cut. Yet worker-employer discussions about cuts in pay, benefits, or hours in lieu of layoffs are exceedingly rare. Roughly one-quarter of the layoffs in our sample violate the theoretical condition for bilaterally efficient separations. We draw on our findings and other evidence to assess theories of wage stickiness and its role in layoffs.