Regulating Conglomerates: Evidence from an Energy Conservation Program in China
研究中国一项针对大型制造企业集团的节能监管政策，发现受监管企业削减产量并将部分生产转移至集团内未受监管企业，而非提高能效；若碳减排效益每吨超过161美元则政策提升福利，利用商业网络信息的替代政策可增加10%的节能总量。
We study a prominent energy regulation affecting large Chinese manufacturers that are part of broader conglomerates. Using detailed firm-level data and difference-in-differences research designs, we show that regulated firms cut output and shifted some production to unregulated firms within their conglomerate instead of improving their energy efficiency. To account for conglomerate and market spillovers, we interpret these results through the lens of an industry equilibrium model featuring conglomerate production. The policy raises welfare if the per ton benefits of carbon reduction exceed $161. Alternative policies that exploit public information on business networks can increase aggregate energy savings by 10 percent.