Stakeholder orientation and insider trading
利用美国各州通过利益相关者法规的外生冲击，研究发现利益相关者导向能显著抑制机会主义内幕交易，尤其在信息不对称高和监管弱的环境中效果更强，并减少其他财务不当行为。
Abstract Using the staggered adoption of constituency statutes across US states as an exogenous shock to stakeholder orientation, we examine its impact on opportunistic insider trading. We show a strong mitigating effect of stakeholder orientation on insider trading. We find that firms incorporated in states that passed stakeholder constituency statutes have a lower likelihood of opportunistic insider purchases, particularly in environments characterized by high information asymmetry and weak monitoring. Additionally, we find that stakeholder orientation mitigates other measures of financial misconduct, like securities class action lawsuits and financial misstatements. Our results are supported by a variety of robustness and causality tests.