Regulatory Fragmentation
研究了多个联邦机构监管同一问题导致的碎片化现象，发现其增加企业成本、降低生产率和利润，并阻碍行业进入、迫使小企业退出，主要源于机构间的不一致。
ABSTRACT Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government's official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. Fragmentation increases the firm's costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry and increases the propensity of small firms to exit. These effects arise from redundancy and, more prominently, from inconsistencies between government agencies. Our results uncover a new source of regulatory burden, and we show that agency costs among regulators contribute to this burden.